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Abstract 
This paper estimates the determinants of households’ choice between fixed rate (FRM) and 
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) contracts, using the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth. Contrary to the predictions of the theoretical literature, the analysis 
shows that most household characteristics proxying for exposure to other (non-mortgage-
related) risks and for individual risk aversion are irrelevant for the choice. This, in turn, 
crucially depends on the relative price of the mortgages and on whether the household is 
liquidity constrained. Liquidity constrained households find ARMs particularly attractive 
because their initial payments are generally lowest, ceteris paribus. This is so despite some 
evidence that the premium that lenders charge over their cost of funds is substantially higher 
on ARMs than on FRMs. Taken together, the evidence suggests that ARM holders do not 
fully take into account the risk of a rise of the reference interest rates. On the other hand, 
lenders price quite expensively this risk and borrowers end up paying a high price for the 
benefit of low initial payments. 
JEL classification: D10, G1, G21, E4. 
Keywords: home purchase finance, adjustable rate mortgages, fixed rate mortgages 
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1. Introductioni 
Housing is the most important asset in the portfolio of most households. It is a relatively 
illiquid investment, with an uncertain capital value, and it is generally highly leveraged, 
which makes it a potentially important channel of transmission of monetary policy. 
Furthermore, houses are both an asset and a consumption good.ii  
This paper focuses on housing finance. In recent years, in addition to the traditional 
fixed and adjustable rate mortgage contracts, borrowers have been given a wide variety of 
financing methods from which to choose. Examples include pledged savings accounts, 
interest-only mortgages, graduated and flexible payment mortgages, reverse annuity 
mortgages, renegotiable rate mortgages and numerous others.iii However, although there is 
substantial cross-country variation as to which type of mortgage contract is most common, 
by far the dominant two have been the standard fixed rate and the adjustable rate mortgage. 
In the United States, for example, most mortgage debt is at rates that are fixed for the entire 
duration of the contract (although prepayment options are frequent), whereas in the UK there 
is very little mortgage debt that is fixed for more than a few years. In the rest of Europe, 
despite increasing financial integration, as Figure 1 shows, housing credit systems have 
continued to be characterized by different types of contracts, with France and Germany, at 
one end, where over half of lending is at rates that are fixed for 10 years or longer, and 
Finland and Portugal, at the other, where basically no loans are granted at rates that are fixed 
for over five years. 
The specific contractual features of housing finance have important implications from a 
policy perspective, due to the effects that changes in interest rates may have on house price 
stability and on household behavior and welfare. Although there are several channels 
through which changes in interest rates can affect the housing market, the household sector 
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is likely to play a key role in those countries with predominantly adjustable-rate mortgage 
contracts, since in this case households bear the risk of higher rates directly through their 
higher mortgage payments and smaller remaining income. Nevertheless, it must be said that, 
although a nominal fixed-rate mortgage is safe in the sense that its nominal payments are 
fixed, from the perspective of the borrower it is also risky because its real capital value is 
highly sensitive to inflation. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the choice between the two dominant types of 
contract, adjustable-rate (ARMs) and fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). The borrower’s choice 
between mortgage contracts can be viewed as a problem in household risk management and 
we are interested in assessing whether households can gauge accurately their circumstances 
in terms of (non-mortgage related) risk exposure and choose either a fixed-rate mortgage or 
an adjustable-rate one as appropriate. In this sense, our empirical setup provides a setting to 
test some of the predictions of Campbell and Cocco (2003), who view the choice of a 
mortgage contract from a normative perspective and single out the characteristics of a 
household that should lead it to prefer one form of mortgage over the other. In fact, in 
principle the relative attractiveness of a specific type of contract should depend on individual 
circumstances, such as the riskiness of labor income, borrowing constraints, and the 
probability of moving and pre-paying the loan.  
We conduct our empirical analysis using data on Italy, where the market for mortgages 
is relatively small but has been growing exceptionally fast in the past decade.iv This makes 
Italy a particularly suitable setting to study housing finance. In fact, there is evidence that 
housing credit systems are characterized by high degrees of inertia, with the contractual 
features of new mortgages partly reflecting contracts and conventions established in earlier 
periods, when inflation, interest rate variability and regulatory practices were very different. 
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Contractual inertia is less likely to play a relevant role in Italian households’ mortgage 
choice. Furthermore, the dataset that we use is representative of the whole population, 
whereas most of the existing studies of household mortgage choice use data that have been 
collected locally, or by some specific lending institution. 
We find that, conditional on holding a mortgage, the ARM vs. FRM choice depends 
only partially on borrower characteristics. Overall, pricing variables seem to play a dominant 
role and the evidence suggests that in choosing the mortgage type borrowers attach very 
much weight to the initial level of repayment. Although the initial payments tend to be lower 
on ARMs, cetris paribus, it seems that the premium that banks charge over their cost of 
funds is much higher on ARMs than on FRMs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the choice between fixed and adjustable rate mortgages. Section 3 
presents the data that we employ for the estimation. Section 4 discusses the empirical setup 
and some empirical issues. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
2. The ARM vs. FRM choice in the literature 
The literature on the choice between fixed and adjustable rate mortgages dates back at 
least to the first half of the Eighties, but it is still quite scant. Among the first theoretical 
contributions is that of Baesel and Biger (1980), who have stressed that the optimal choice 
between ARMs and FRMs depends on the correlation between the rate of inflation and 
borrowers’ labour income. If such a correlation is low, a rise in nominal interest rates is not 
matched by a wage increase and this augments the burden of the repayment of an ARM, so 
that FRMs are to be preferred. Statman (1982) adds to this framework, suggesting that when 
considered as part of the solution to a mean-variance portfolio problem, the optimal choice 
between adjustable and fixed rate mortgages should also depend on the expected future value 
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of the house, and therefore on house price inflation. Alm and Follain (1984) extend the 
analysis and include various types of constraints, such as minimum down-payments, 
maximum payment-to-income ratios and positive net worth constraints. 
More recently, Campbell and Cocco (2003) have studied the optimal choice between 
adjustable and fixed rate mortgages in a more general framework, allowing for income 
uncertainty, risk aversion, variability in the end-of-period value of the house, credit 
constraints and FRM refinancing options. Their seminal contribution stresses that ARMs 
expose borrowers to income risk, while FRMs expose them to wealth risk. As such, 
“households with smaller houses relative to income, more stable income, lower risk 
aversion, more lenient treatment in bankruptcy and higher probability of moving should be 
the households that find ARMs more attractive”. 
The empirical evidence on the determinants of the choice between adjustable and fixed 
rate mortgages is also limited. Among the most cited results are those of Dhillon et al. 
(1987), who estimate a standard binary choice model using a sample of about 80 borrowers 
from the Baton Rouge office of a national US mortgage bank between January 1983 and 
February 1984. Their results do not match the predictions of the theoretical literature and  
show instead that borrower characteristics have a very weak effect on the choice between 
adjustable and fixed rates, while price variables have a sizeable and significant role. Similar 
evidence is provided by Brueckner and Follain (1988), who follow a two step procedure in 
that they first estimate the interest rate that each borrower would have obtained had she 
chosen the alternative type of mortgage and then use the imputed rate as an explanatory 
variable in the mortgage choice model.v Their results confirm that the interest rate 
differential is the major determinant of the choice.  Besides this, they find that when market 
interest rates are higher, borrowers tend to prefer ARMs, ceteris paribus, as if they expected 
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some degree of mean reversion. Consistent with some of the theoretical predictions, they 
also find that borrowers with higher income and higher savings, and therefore less likely to 
be credit constrained in the future, have a preference for ARMs. Finally, they show that 
borrowers with a higher probability of moving (and pre-paying the loan) have a preference 
for adjustable rate mortgages. Indeed, if the borrower knows that it will move in the near 
future, thus selling the home and pre-paying the loan, the most appropriate contract would be 
the one with the lowest current interest rate.  
3. The data 
We estimate our model using data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) and consider the last five surveys covering the period 1995-2004,vi which 
contain detailed and homogeneous information on housing finance. The SHIW is a 
representative sample of the Italian resident population. It has a rotating panel component 
with fifty percent of households being re-interviewed in the following survey. It provides 
detailed data on household socio-demographic characteristics, consumption, income and 
balance sheet items and has plenty of information on housing tenure and finance.vii 
After some exclusions,viii we are left with a sample of over 28,000 observations, whose 
composition is reported in table 1. About 75 percent of households own their home and 
around 13 percent of homeowners has a mortgage. About half of mortgage holders has a 
fixed rate loan. For the appraisal of the determinants of the choice between ARMs vs. FRMs, 
we focus on those mortgage holders who have purchased their home in the two years prior to 
the interviewix and assume that they have obtained the loan, or re-contracted the terms of an 
outstanding mortgage, at the time of the purchase. These households represent around 16 
percent of the mortgage holders in the sample and exhibit a relatively higher share of 
adjustable rate mortgage holders. For those mortgage holders who have purchased their 
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home at earlier dates, there is no sufficient information to obtain reliable measures of their 
characteristics at the time when they acquired their home, which may have affected their 
financing choice (for e.g. income and wealth in the years before the interview are not 
available). 
Table 2 reports some summary statistics for the whole sample of households, for that of 
homeowners, for mortgage holders, and for several sub-samples. For details regarding the 
exact definition and source of the variables, see the data appendix. Most of the differences in 
terms of socio-economic characteristics between mortgage holders and the rest of the 
households in the sample are due to the fact that mortgage holders are relatively younger. So, 
with respect to the sample average, the head of a household with a mortgage is more likely to 
be a male, to be married, and is more educated. Mortgage holders’ net income is 
substantially higher and the number of income recipients (not reported in the table) is also 
higher. In addition,  they are more likely to be self-employed, to live in the North of Italy 
and to have moved from their province of birth. Most of the differences in terms of real asset 
wealth come from the fact that 25 percent of the sample consist of renters, who tend to be 
less wealthy than homeowners. In terms of financial wealth, mortgage holders have fewer 
financial assets and their liabilities are higher. The fourth column of the table reports 
summary statistics for the sub-sample of “recent” borrowers, i.e. mortgage holders who have 
purchased their home and obtained a loan in the two years before the interview. This set, 
which we use for the estimation, is very similar to the sample of all borrowers. 
The last two columns of the table distinguish between “recent” borrowers with an FRM 
and “recent” borrowers with an ARM. The head of a household with an ARM is more likely 
to be a male, is more educated and is more likely to have moved away from her province of 
birth. ARM holders are wealthier, but have less financial assets. They are more likely to 
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invest in risky assets (stocks and corporate bonds), but invest smaller amounts on average. 
Their liabilities are slightly higher. 
Table 3 summarizes some characteristics of the mortgage loans held by the “recent” 
borrowers. ARM holders borrow larger amounts, but the differences in terms of loan-to-
house value are negligible: the loan-to-value ratio is around 44 percent. Mortgage payments 
on ARMs are larger, but as a share of borrower’s earnings, they turn out to be slightly lower 
(17.6 vs. 18.8 percent). The average interest rate is comparable. Under the assumption that 
lenders charge borrowers a rate given by the sum of their cost of funds plus a premium, this 
implies that the premium on ARMs is higher than that on FRMs. In fact, over the sample 
period considered, short-term rates – the benchmark for ARMs – have been lower than long-
term rates – the benchmark for FRMs. Based on this, we have computed the premium 
charged to mortgage holders as the difference between the mortgage rate paid by the 
household in the year of interview and the interest rate of one-year government bonds – if it 
is an ARM – or the interest rate of government bonds with a maturity as close as possible as 
that of the mortgage – if it is a FRM. The premium charged to ARM holders amounts to 125 
basis points on average, over 100 points higher than the average premium of FRM holders. 
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4. The empirical framework 
We consider an environment where at each date households choose whether to buy a house 
and ask for a loan to finance the purchase. When demanding a loan for home purchase 
financing, households can choose between two types of contracts, adjustable rate mortgages 
and fixed rate mortgages. Conditional on buying and borrowing, we assume that the choice 
between mortgage contracts is a function of household characteristics and of the relative cost 
of the loans and estimate the following probit regression: 
Pr (Yijt = k) = f (Xit, Zjt), k = 0, 1;  (1) 
where: Yijt = 1 if the mortgage that household i has taken at time t in the housing and credit 
market j is an ARM and Yijt = 0 if it is an FRM; Xit denotes the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the household i at time t (e.g., size, income, wealth), and Zjt includes the 
characteristics of the mortgage products available, which may vary across credit markets j 
and over time (e. g., the interest rates). 
In practice, we estimate equation (1) on the sample of “recent” borrowers. We therefore 
exclude all those households whose mortgage demand at time t is non-positive, which 
comprise renters, those who have purchased their home without needing financing, those 
who have inherited or just haven’t paid for it and all those who are not moving and 
purchasing a home at t. We must therefore allow for the possibility that our sample is 
“selected”, so that the mortgage type choice is not independent from the decision to buy a 
new house and borrow. We address this issue by estimating the model in steps as follows. 
First, we estimate a probit for the probability of purchasing one’s home with a mortgage, and 
compute the Heckman correction term for the censoring of the loan demand. Then, we 
estimate equation (1), the probit for choosing an ARM over an FRM, augmented by the 
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Heckman correction term. As it is discussed below, identification is achieved by exclusion 
restrictions. 
We conclude the analysis by estimating a propensity score matching model to appraise 
the differences between ARMs and FRMs. A direct comparison is not feasible because we 
are unable to observe the characteristics of the FRM contract offered to someone who has 
then chosen an ARM and viceversa. The differences in the terms and features of the 
contracts can be expected to be the most crucial determinant of the choice. Including these 
differences as regressors in equation (1) is however problematic, because some of the 
characteristics of the mortgage granted to household i may be endogenous to its choice. 
 The estimation of a propensity score matching model amounts to comparing mortgages 
granted to households that are similar in all respects, except for their choice between 
adjustable versus fixed rates loans.x In practice, we split our sample between ARMs 
(‘treated’ observations) and FRMs (‘untreated’ or ‘control’ observations), match each 
‘treated’ observation with a set of ‘untreated’ observations (chosen so as to be as similar as 
possible to the ‘untreated’ ones), and then compare the characteristics of the loans issued to 
the two groups. More formally, defining as ZA a generic attribute of an ARM, as ZF the same 
attribute for an FRM and as X a set of household, credit and housing market characteristics, 
this procedure amounts to estimating: 
α  ≡ E [(ZA ) – (ZF)| X],  (2) 
where α is the relevant variable for the appraisal of the mortgage type choice. 
  11
5. Estimation results 
5.1. Choosing whether to buy and take out a mortgage or not: an affordability problem 
As previously discussed, before estimating equation (1), we need to evaluate a binary choice 
model for the probability that a household has purchased its home in the two years prior the 
interview and has taken out a mortgage, i.e. that it has purchased a home, asked for a loan to 
finance it and obtained it. In this instance, the control group is the entire population in the 
sample, as it is appropriate in relation to the type of sample selection bias that potentially 
affects the estimation of the model for mortgage choice. 
The probability of purchasing a new home depends on a set of observable and 
unobservable household preference parameters and on a set of “affordability” constraints. 
The latter consist in a wealth constraint, which determines one’s ability to afford the outright 
purchase of one’s home or the required down-payment, and in an income constraint, which 
determines one’s ability to meet any scheduled mortgage payments. The wealth and income 
constraints depend in turn on household’s net wealth and income, on the terms of the 
mortgage contract, and on the desired level of housing – hence, on the household socio-
economic status and demographic characteristics – and of non-housing consumption. These 
affordability constraints can result in liquidity constraints that would prevent moving or 
outright home ownership. 
To estimate the model we need to find at least one variable that affects the decision to 
purchase one’s home and ask for a mortgage, but not that regarding the type of loan.  We 
chose the share of households renting their home and a polynomial in the average annual 
per-square meter rent, which varies per province and year of interview. These variables 
capture the development of the rental market, which matters for household’s mobility and is 
particularly relevant for the choice to own one’s home, as opposed to rent it. We also use the 
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number of banks where the household holds a bank account, which can be expected to be 
positively related to the individual’s information on financial instruments. The coefficients 
of these variables turn out to be statistically significant in the decision to ask for a loan, but 
not in that regarding the choice of the type of mortgage. 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of the selection equation, where the 
dependent variable is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the household has purchased its home 
and financed the purchase with a mortgage in the two years before the interview. We include 
year dummies because households from different surveys are pooled together and dummies 
for the province of residence to control for heterogeneity. Interpreting the regressor 
coefficients is not straightforward, as most variables affect both the demand and the supply 
of credit and the signs of the two effects might be different, possibly cancelling each other 
out. 
The variables that we use for identification are all strongly significant. The coefficient 
on the share of households renting their home is negative, which is consistent with the 
hypotheses that the fraction of renters proxies for the efficiency of the rental market and that 
the more efficient the rental market the lower the likelihood to buy and borrow. Furthermore, 
the probability that a household has purchased its home and obtained a mortgage is concave 
in the rental prices and peaks past the median: the higher the rents, the more attractive the 
home purchase; however, if rental prices are very high, it becomes difficult for households to 
accumulate enough savings to afford the down-payment required for a home purchase. 
Finally, the coefficient on the number of banks where household members have accounts is 
positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that this variable captures financial 
“education” and the overall familiarity with the financial instruments that are available to 
households.  
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Loan price considerations do seem to matter, as the probability of buying and financing 
the purchase with a mortgage is significantly decreasing in interest rates. Also the term 
spread of 10-year government bonds over 1-year bills as a ratio of income is significant, 
which captures household’s ability to endure future rate changes: the higher the term spread 
relative to income the lower the likelihood of borrowing. Furthermore, the higher the per-
square meter price, the more likely that the buyer will need some finance. 
The evidence regarding the other variables included in the regression is consistent with 
theoretical predictions and with the results of other studies on credit market participation 
(see, among others, Magri 2002 and Fabbri and Padula 2004). In equilibrium, mortgage 
market participation turns out to be decreasing in the household head’s age, which is 
consistent with the presumption that the young make up for a large share of home buyers and 
with the life-cycle hypothesis that the demand for credit is relatively higher for young 
consumers, whose earnings profiles are upward sloping. This effect seems to prevail over the 
supply side adverse selection considerations suggesting that debts ceilings may be lower for 
young consumers than for the rest of the population. The probability of home purchasing 
with a mortgage is higher for married couples, to whom banks are relatively more inclined to 
lend, especially when first-time buyers. It is lower among those living in small 
municipalities, possibly as a result of wider intra-household informal credit in small towns. 
The joint significance of the provincial dummies cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the 
coefficients of these dummies (not shown) reveal a pattern: those households living in the 
central and southern provinces are less likely to finance the home purchase with a mortgage, 
even allowing for the positive coefficients on the area dummies (Living in the Center and 
Living in the South). This is indeed consistent with both lower supply, due for example to 
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greater aggregate risk or contract enforcement problems, but also with lower demand, due 
for example to wider intra-household informal credit. 
The probability of having purchased a home and taken out a mortgage is concave in 
income. It is convex in (beginning of period) net wealth, although the minimum is achieved 
at the 99th percentile of the distribution. All this is consistent with the view that, given the 
collateral, banks’ willingness to lend depends on income, which proxies for the ability to pay 
regularly the installments on the mortgage: the lower the income, the lower the likelihood of 
being granted large amounts of credit, no matter how large one’s wealth is (an income-
wealth interaction term would not affect the result). On the other hand, the higher one’s 
wealth and income, the greater the ability of paying off the house at the time of purchase, 
and therefore the lower the demand for credit. Ceteris paribus, the probability of having 
purchased a home and taken a mortgage is increasing in the cost of housing relative to that of 
non-durable consumption (measured by the ratio of rent – actual or imputed – to expenditure 
on non-durable goods). 
Finally, the probability of asking and obtaining a mortgage is not significantly affected 
by the number of bank branches in the local credit market, nor by the efficiency of the legal 
enforcement as captured by the length of civil trials in the judicial district where the 
household lives. 
5.2. Choosing between FRMs and ARMs: a risk-management problem 
Next, we estimate a binary choice model for the probability of choosing a specific mortgage 
type. This choice amounts essentially to one between different types of risk. A nominal FRM 
is a risky contract because its capital value is highly sensitive to inflation. On the other hand, 
the risk of an ARM comes from the short-term variability in the real payments that are 
required in each period. This variability matters especially if the borrower faces binding 
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liquidity constraints. In fact, constraints bind in states of the world with low income and low 
house prices; in these instances, buffer-stock savings are low and home-equity falls below 
the minimum required to obtain a second loan. The risk of an ARM is that it will require 
higher interest payments in this situation causing a cut in consumption. As Campbell and 
Cocco (2003) point out, homeowners with expensive houses relative to their income, volatile 
labor income or high risk aversion are particularly adversely affected by this type of risk. 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of the probit for the probability that 
borrowers choose an ARM. As mentioned earlier, the model is estimated on the sample of 
households who have purchased their home in the two years prior the interview and have 
asked and obtained a loan to finance their purchase. As a measure of the goodness of fit, we 
consider the model’s ability to classify borrowers. Using a 50 percent cutoff point to 
optimally classify borrowers with a high propensity to take out an ARM, the model is able to 
predict correctly the behaviour of around 80 percent of them.xi 
In the regression we control for the rate on ARMs and for the spread between fixed and 
adjustable rates. Since we do not observe the rates that mortgage holders would have been 
charged if they had chosen the alternative type of mortgage, we have predicted them by 
regressing the relevant mortgage rate on household and market specific characteristics, such  
as age, education, occupation, short-term and long-term (province-level) interest rates on 
bank loans.xii FRMs are less likely when the variable interest rates are lower and when the 
fixed-adjustable interest rate spread is higher. The coefficient on the interest rate on ARMs is 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, suggesting that, for a 
given spread, an increase in short-term rates reduces the likelihood of taking on a fixed rate 
mortgage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that borrowers expect some mean reversions 
in market interest rates. Instead, a one percentage point increase in the imputed spread 
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between fixed and adjustable rates raises the probability of taking out an ARM by 10 
percentage points.  
Average house prices have a positive statistically significant coefficient. This is 
consistent with the view that households choose the lowest interest rate, which is typically 
that on ARMs, if they are facing a relatively large expense and are therefore more likely to 
be closer to being liquidity constrained (this variable could however capture some time-
varying province specific factor, correlated with house prices, which we do not control for). 
Relative to household income, house prices have a negative effect on the probability of 
choosing an ARM. This suggests that households are aware that when prices are high 
relative to income the variability of ARM payments may pose greater risks.  
Overall, individual borrower characteristics have little influence on the mortgage choice 
decision, which is in line with the evidence of Dhillon et al. (1987) for the United States. 
Notable exceptions are the household head’s age and the dummy for having children, whose 
signs are negative. The fact that older borrowers are less likely to demand ARMs could be 
rationalized on the ground of lesser liquidity constraints. Households with children could be 
less likely to demand ARMs, because people with children tend to behave in a more risk 
averse way. 
Quite surprisingly, compared with the stark theoretical predictions of Campbell and 
Cocco (2003), the choice is also unrelated to the type of employment and to income and 
wealth. Holding everything else constant, the results indicate a positive relationship between 
the probability of taking out an ARM and the ratio of non-durable consumption-to-income, 
but only among those for whom such ratio is very high and for whom the benefits of low 
initial payments can be particularly large. 
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Stronger competition in the credit market, measured by the number of bank branches per 
thousand of inhabitants, is associated with a higher propensity to take on ARMs. Finally, the 
coefficients on unreported time dummies become significantly different from zero and 
positive starting from the year 2000, after Italy joined the European Monetary Union, 
consistent with the hypothesis that, expecting a more stable monetary environment, 
borrowers have moved further towards ARMs. 
The third column of the table reports the result of a probit estimate where we control for 
sample selection, in order to verify whether the sub-sample of “recent” borrowers, that we 
use for the estimation, is “selected”. Our analysis of the mortgage type decision appears to 
be robust to the inclusion of a Heckman correction term based on the probit of Table 4. In 
fact, the additional regressor is not significant, nor it affects the coefficients of the other 
variables in any noteworthy way. A likelihood ratio test of independent equations does not 
reject the null at the 59 percent level. Hence, we can safely consider the mortgage type 
choice independent from that of having purchased a home with a mortgage. 
Finally, the last column presents the result of a specification where a dummy for the 
“main bank” of the household is introduced. This should permit a better control for supply 
conditions, if there is a common component for all clients of the same bank. Indeed, the 
coefficients of the dummy variables for the major eighteen banks considered are jointly 
significantly different from zero, although very few of them are so when considered 
individually. Most interesting, the coefficients of the other variables included in the 
regression are virtually unchanged, confirming the overall robustness of the original 
specification. 
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5.3. Characteristics of ARMs and FRMs 
As a final exercise, we have checked whether ARMs and FRMs show significant differences 
with respect to their most important characteristics: size, interest rate, value of the house that 
is bought, loan-to-house value ratio, average value of the installments, maturity and the 
premium charged by banks over their cost of funds. This has been done using the propensity 
score matching technique described in section 3, which amounts to comparing the average 
value of the feature under scrutiny across mortgages with the most similar characteristics, 
except for having an adjustable or a fixed interest rate. 
Quite surprisingly, the results reported in table Table 6 show that, after controlling for 
borrowers’ individual characteristics, the only significant difference between ARM and 
FRM contracts is the premium that banks charge over their cost of funds. In fact, although 
adjustable rate mortgages are slightly larger, have slightly higher interest rates, are used to 
finance the purchase of more expensive houses, have a slightly longer maturity, and have the 
same loan-to-value ratio, none of these differences is statistically different from zero. The 
only significant difference is in the interest rate premium, that is much higher for ARMs than 
for FRMs. Such premium reflects borrower’s riskiness and any markup that a lender 
enjoying some form of market power can charge. Taken together, this evidence suggests that 
lenders are pricing quite expensively the higher interest rate risk that ARMs pose on 
borrowers and borrowers are paying a high price for the benefit of low initial payments. 
6. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
The stock of mortgages for home purchases in Italy and in most developed countries has 
risen substantially over the past decade. Understanding the functioning of this market is of 
increasing importance, because of the potential effects that changes in house prices, inflation 
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and interest rates – in particular interest rate rises from the actual historically low levels – 
can have on the investment and consumption choices of the growing number of indebted 
households. The evidence presented in this paper, although preliminary, has provided a basis 
to answer some questions that are still open. 
A first issue is that of the determinants of the rapid surge in house related lending in the 
past decade. Based on the results of the empirical analysis, in Italy, both demand and supply 
factors seem to have mattered. Among the demand factors, the reduction in the interest rates 
seems indeed to have favoured an increase of the number of households holding a mortgage 
– although the size of this effect is not as significant as one might have been expected. 
Among the supply factors, the positive correlation between the number of bank branches in a 
province and the probability that its inhabitants hold a mortgage points to the increase in 
bank diffusion and competition as one of the possible explanations for the increase in house 
financing. 
A second important question that the results of the empirical analysis help answering is 
what are the characteristics of households holding ARMs – facing a higher risk of suffering a 
cut in consumption in case of an increase in interest rates –, and of those taking on FRMs – 
facing a higher capital value risk. Contrary to the indications of the theoretical literature, 
household characteristics proxying for risk aversion and exposure to other non-mortgage-
related risks seem to have very low explanatory power on the choice between ARMs and 
FRMs. Indeed, the only significant characteristics in the equation explaining households’ 
mortgage choices are the age of the head and whether there are children in the house: both 
reduce the probability of taking on an ARM. Moreover, borrowers with very high 
expenditures on non-durable goods, that are more likely to be currently liquidity constrained, 
are also more likely to choose an ARM.  
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What seems to matter the most in the choice are the price variables. FRMs are less likely 
when the fixed-adjustable rate spread is high and when, for a given spread, the adjustable 
rate is high, consistent with the hypothesis that borrowers expect interest rates to be partly 
mean-reverting. Households buying houses in expensive areas are more attracted by ARMs, 
possibly because they are cheaper in the short-run. However, the higher the per-square meter 
price relative to their income, the less likely borrowers are to take on an ARM, possibly 
because they fear to be unable to repay the loan if interest rates rise. On the supply side, 
stronger bank competition seems to favour ARMs, as shown by the positive coefficient of 
the number of branches per inhabitants. 
Overall, these results provide some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that ARMs 
are a significantly more attractive form of mortgage for those households that currently face 
some type of liquidity constraint. These households attribute a particularly high value to the 
level of the initial payment, which is generally lower than that on FRMs, tend to overlook 
the overall cost of the mortgage, and do not fully take into account the risk of a rise of the 
reference interest rates. On the other hand, lenders price quite expensively this risk and 
borrowers end up paying a high price for the benefit of low initial payments. In fact, after 
controlling for borrowers characteristics, the only significant difference between ARMs and 
FRMs is in the premium that lenders charge over their cost of funds. Hence, overall, some 
attention should be paid to the negative effects that an increase in interest rates might have 
on ARM holders. On the contrary, on the side of banks, there seems to be no evidence of 
excessive risk taking. 
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Data appendix 
Definition and source of the variables used in the estimation. 
Table 4: 
Age, education, marital status, occupation (public employee, self-employed, unemployed) 
refer to the head of the household. High education is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the 
household head has a high school diploma or a university degree. Source: Bank of Italy 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). 
Household size refers to the number of individuals in the household. Source: SHIW. 
Household income is the sum of all incomes of all household members. Source: SHIW.  
Lagged household net wealth has been computed by subtracting household savings from 
end-of-period household net wealth. Source: SHIW. 
Small town is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the household lives in a town with less than 
40,000 inhabitants. Source: SHIW. 
Moved from province of birth is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the household head lives in 
province which is different from that where she was born. Source: SHIW. 
Cost of housing/non-durable expenditure is the ratio of rent for renters or imputed rent for 
owners to non-durable expenditure. Source: SHIW. 
Share of renters is the ratio of the number of households living in a province that report to 
rent their home in the year of interview to the number of households living in that province 
in that year. Source: SHIW. 
Rent x m2 is the average of per-m2 actual rent for renters and per-m2 imputed rent for owners 
living in the same province for each year of interview. Per-m2 actual rent and per-m2 
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imputed rent have been computed by dividing actual rent and imputed rent by the size of the 
house, which is reported in m2. Source: SHIW. 
House prices x m2 is the average per-m2 price of residential dwellings located in the province 
where the household lives, in the survey year. Source: Il Consulente Immobiliare (Il 
Sole24Ore). 
Lagged mortgage rate refers to the rate that banks charge household on long-term loans. It is 
computed as average over the loans granted to households living in the same province. To 
those who borrow in the two years before that of interview we attach the average rate 
charged the year before that of borrowing. To those who do not borrow we attach the 
average rate charged the year before that of the survey. Source: Central Credit Registry. 
Term spread to income is the ratio of the difference between the returns of ten and one year 
government bonds to nominal household income. Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance 
and SHIW. 
Branches per 1,000 inhabitants refers to the number of bank branches in the province where 
the household lives, in the survey year. Source: Bank Supervisory Reports. 
Number of banks is the number of different banks where any household member has a 
checking or saving account.  Source: SHIW. 
Per capita GDP refers to the value added of the province where the household lives in the 
year of interview, with the exception of 2004. For 2004 the data are not yet available and we 
use GDP for 2003. Source: Conti Economici Territoriali, National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT). 
Length of civil trials is the average number of days for a civil trial (first and second degree of 
judgement). The average is computed by judicial district and per year. Source: Annuario 
delle Statistiche Giudiziarie Civili, National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
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Provincial dummies and dummies for Center and South refer to the location where the 
household lives in the year of interview. Source: SHIW. 
Table 5 (variables non included in table 4, only): 
Interest rate on ARMs is the rate on ARMs estimated in a first stage regression of interest 
rates on borrowers’ and credit market characteristics. Source: estimate based on SHIW data. 
FRM – ARM spread is the difference between the rate on ARMs and that on FRMs estimated 
in a first stage regression of interest rates on borrowers’ and credit market characteristics. 
Source: estimate based on SHIW data. 
Children is a dummy that takes on value 1 if any member of the household is less than 18 
years old. Source: SHIW. 
No. of income recipients refers to the number of individuals who receive an income. Source: 
SHIW. 
Non-durable expenditure/income is the ratio of household non-durable expenditure to 
household income. Source: SHIW. 
Probability of moving is the probability that a household moves from its province of birth 
estimated with a probit regression on borrowers and geographical characteristics. Source: 
SHIW. 
(Non-durable expenditure/income)>0.9 is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the ratio of 
household non-durable expenditure to household income is greater than 0.9. Source: SHIW. 
Maturity ratio is computed as ratio of the average maturity on ARMs over the average 
maturity of FRMs. Average maturity is by area (North, Center, South) and year. Source: 
SHIW. 
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Table 6 (variables non included in table 4 and 5, only): 
Mortgage size is the value of the loan. Source: SHIW. 
Interest rate is the actual value of the interest rate on the mortgage. Source: SHIW. 
Average value of instalment is the average mortgage repayment over the year. Source: 
SHIW. 
Maturity is the maturity of the mortgage loan, in years. Source: SHIW. 
Loan-to-value ratio is the ratio of mortgage size and the value of the house. Source: SHIW. 
Risk premium is the difference between the mortgage rate paid by the household in the year 
of interview and the interest rate of one-year government bonds – if it is an ARM – or the 
interest rate of government bonds with a maturity as close as possible as that of the mortgage 
– if it is a FRM. Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance and SHIW. 
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i We thank for their comments and suggestions participants at the XIV International “Tor Vergata” 
Conference on Banking and Finance (Rome, December 2005), at the Finance and Consumption Workshop on 
Consumption and Credit in Countries with Developing Credit Markets (Fiesole, June 2006), at the 62nd 
Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Paphos, August 2006) and at the XLVI Annual 
Conference of the Società Italiana degli Economisti (Verona, October 2006). The views expressed are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. Address for correspondence: Monica 
Paiella, Bank of Italy, Research Department, Via Nazionale 91, Roma 00184, Italy, tel. +39.06.4792.2595, fax. 
+39.06.4792.3723. E-mail addresses: monica.paiella@bancaditalia.it; pozzolo@unimol.it. 
ii The unusual features of housing wealth and its importance to households have raised a host of 
questions including the effects of illiquid risky housing on savings and portfolio choice (see, for example, 
Flavin and Yamashita 2002; Cocco 2001; and Paiella 2001), the effects of housing wealth on consumption (see, 
for example, Guiso et al. 2006; Pellizzon and Weber 2003, Skinner 1996; and Engelhardt 1996), the effects of 
taxation and mortgage laws on tenure and housing financing choices (see, for example, Jappelli and Pistaferri 
2004; Poterba 2001; and Maki 2001). 
iii The pledged saving account mortgage is a type of mortgage in which the borrower’s payments are 
supplemented by payments from a saving account pledged as additional collateral for the loan. The saving 
account is established with the downpayment. An interest-only mortgage can be paid back through many 
various forms of savings or investment plans that build independently over the term to equal the amount of the 
original mortgage debt. In the graduated and flexible payment mortgages, the payment starts low and rises over 
time. A reverse annuity mortgage works much like traditional mortgages, only in reverse: a homeowner 
borrows against the equity in her home and receives regular payments from the lender. Renegotiable rate 
mortgages consist of automatically renewable mortgages of three to five years which are secured by a long-
term mortgage for up to 30 years. At the end of each short-term period, interest rates are adjusted based on a 
national average mortgage rate index.  
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iv In the last decade the ratio of Italy residential debt to GDP rose from slightly more than 6 percent to 
almost 15 percent of GDP. In 2004 it was about a third of the EU15 average and less than a fifth of the ratio for 
the US. From a supply side perspective, loans to households accounted for over 15 percent of bank total loans 
versus an EU average of about 30 percent. 
v  In practice, they estimate a mortgage supply equation and use it to calculate the interest rate on an 
FRM that would have been charged to an ARM holder had he made the alternative choice, and vice-versa. 
vi The Survey is biannual with the exception of the 1998 wave, which was run three years after the 
previous one. For a description and assessment of the survey, see Brandolini and Cannari (1994). The overall 
quality of the data has also been analyzed more recently by Battistin et al. (2003). 
vii The SHIW has been widely used in studies of saving behavior by Italian households. See, for 
example, the essays in the volume edited by Ando et al. (1994). The Survey’s wealth and income data have also 
been used by Guiso et al. (1996) and its consumption information by Miniaci and Weber (1999) and by Jappelli 
and Pistaferri (2000), among others. 
viii From the original sample, we exclude those households whose head is less than 20 or more than 70 
years old (19 percent of the sample), those who do not own, nor pay cash rent for their home (7 percent of the 
sample) and those with non-positive income (0.4 percent of the sample). Furthermore, we exclude about 7 
percent of mortgage holders whose mortgage information are completely inconsistent. For another 4 percent of 
mortgage holders with incomplete information we are able to recover payments or loan data using other 
information, such as those coming from other interviews (for the households in the panel). After dropping all 
those mortgage holders with incomplete or inconsistent mortgage information, we are left with a sample where 
the share of mortgage holders and homeowners is somewhat lower than in the population.  
ix The interviews are run in the spring of the year following that covered by the survey. 
x See Rubin (1979). For a recent survey, see Blundell and Costa Dias (2002).  
xi The pseudo R2 reported in the table is quite low. However, its appraisal is somewhat problematic since 
for the case of a dichotomous dependent variable the upper limit for R2 is likely to be substantially less than 1 
(see Morrison 1972). 
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xii The results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
  
 
 
31
Figure 1 
New residential mortgages in the Euro area by type of interest rate 
(percentage values) 
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Source: Banca d’Italia and ECB. Data refer to new residential mortgages granted between 
January 1 and October 31, 2004. 
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Table 1 
Sample Composition 
Share of: 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Homeowners 0.718 0.751 0.762 0.767 0.753 
Homeowners with home-mortgage 0.173 0.120 0.118 0.117 0.143 
Mortgage holders with ARM 0.462 0.547 0.533 0.512 0.538 
Mortgage holders who have purchased their 
home in the 2 years before that of interview 0.114 0.189 0.175 0.119 0.153 
       of which: with ARM 0.593 0.505 0.532 0.533 0.641 
Number of observations 6,078 5,346 5,844 5,606 5,579 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics: Household characteristics 
All refers to the entire sample. The other columns refer to homeowners, homeowners with a mortgage, households 
who have purchased their home and obtained a mortgage in the two years previous that of interview (“recent” 
borrowers), “recent” borrowers with a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and “recent” borrowers with an adjustable rate 
mortgage (ARM) holders, respectively. * denotes a share of households. (a) indicates that the mean is based on 
positive observations only. Mean values, unless specified otherwise. All monetary variables are evaluated at euros 
of year 2000.  
     “Recent” 
borrowers 
 
 All Home-
owners 
With 
mortgage 
All FRM ARM 
Home owners* 0.750 1 1  1 1 
Mortgage holders* - 0.134 1  1 1 
ARM holders* - - 0.515 0.459 0 1 
Age 51 52 45 41 41 40 
Male head* 0.722 0.737 0.770 0.760 0.750 0.768 
Married* 0.751 0.781 0.864 0.850 0.880 0.827 
Household size 3.026 3.065 3.295 3.116 3.223 3.034 
Less than high school* 0.592 0.565 0.404 0.394 0.462 0.342 
High school diploma* 0.314 0.331 0.459 0.456 0.429 0.477 
University degree* 0.094 0.104 0.137 0.150 0.109 0.181 
Movers from province of birth* 0.264 0.234 0.345 0.335 0.310 0.354 
Living in the North* 0.455 0.448 0.570 0.618 0.495 0.713 
Living in the Center* 0.205 0.217 0.207 0.169 0.201 0.143 
Living in the South and Islands* 0.341 0.335 0.223 0.214 0.304 0.143 
Self-employed* 0.152 0.163 0.179 0.183 0.179 0.186 
Unemployed* 0.034 0.029 0.016 0.014 0.033 0.000 
Total net income 32,100 35,700 38,600 33,600 30,900 35,800 
Net wealth 213,000 272,000 230,900 179,000 163,000 191,000 
Home value - 167,000 178,000 172,000 160,000 182,000 
Real assets other than home 67,100 81,500  64,600 48,100 38,200 55,900 
Deposits and gov. bonds 17,200 19,500 13,600 10,800 11,200 10,500 
Other financial assets* 0.206 0.240 0.262 0.228 0.179 0.266 
Other financial assets 9,200 11,100 9,100  9,400 11,900 7,400 
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Continues Table 2 
Home-related debt* 0.142 0.180 1 1 1 1 
Home-related debt 4,600 5,900 34,000 60,500 56,600 63,500 
Other debt* 0.133 0.120 0.193 0.190 0.174 0.203 
Other debt 832 796 1,295 1,200 1,200 1,200 
No. of observations 28,449 21,333 2,866 421 184 237 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics: Mortgage loan characteristics 
Mean values with standard errors in parentheses. 
 All FRM ARM 
Initial loan 64,800 59,700 68,800 
 (38,500) (37,500) (38,900) 
Loan to value 0.441 0.438 0.443 
 (0.238) (0.247) (0.231) 
Mortgage duration 14.0 13.2 14.6 
 (4.9) (5.1) (4.7) 
Interest rate 6.6% 6.6% 6.5% 
 (3.3%) (3.1%) (3.4%) 
Real interest rate 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 
 (2.8%) (2.7%) (2.8%) 
Annual mortgage payments 5,900 5,600 6,400 
 (3,300) (3,500) (4,900) 
Mortgage payments to earnings 0.180 0.188 0.175 
 (0.121) (0.133) (0.112) 
Default risk premium  0.196 1.250 
  (2.840) (2.699) 
Share of subsidized loans 57.9% 62.3% 54.4% 
    
No. of observations 421 184 237 
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Table 4 
Probability of holding a mortgage 
The dependent variable takes on the value of one if the household has purchased its home and has 
been granted a mortgage in the two years prior that of interview, zero otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses. The estimates have been corrected for cluster for provincial effects. * significant at 10 
per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level. 
 Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Marginal effect 
(standard error) 
Share of renters (per province) -1.41*** -0.01*** 
 (0.47) (0.00) 
Rent x m2 (per province) 0.04*** 2.0e-04*** 
 (0.02) (1.0e-04) 
(Rent x m2)2 0.00*** -1.9e-06*** 
 (0.00) (5.4e-07) 
Number of banks 0.15*** 8.0e-04*** 
 (0.04) (2.0e-04) 
Lagged mortgage rate (per province) -0.38*** -2e-03*** 
 (0.02) (2e-04) 
Term spread to income -0.01*** -7.5e-05*** 
 (0.00) (1.9e-05) 
House price x m2 (per province) 0.20* 1.0e-03* 
 (0.12) (6.0e-04) 
Age/100 -1.86 0.01 
 (1.98) (0.01) 
(Age/100)2 -1.36 -0.01 
 (2.11) (0.01) 
High education 0.12 6.0e-04 
 (0.11) (6.0e-04) 
High ed. X household income/100,000 -0.41 -2.0e-03 
 (0.27) (1.3e-03) 
Married 0.30*** 1.2e-03*** 
 (0.09) (3.0e-04) 
Household size/10 -0.40 -2.0e-03 
 (0.27) (1.4e-03) 
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Continues Table 4 
Small town (<40,000 inhabitants) -0.14* -7.0e-04* 
 (0.08) (4.0e-04) 
Moved from province of birth 0.10 5.0e-04 
 (0.07) (4.0e-04) 
Public emplyoee 0.10* 6.0e-04* 
 (0.06) (4.0e-04) 
Self-employed 0.02 1.0e-04 
 (0.07) (4.0e-04) 
Unemployed -0.03 -1.0e-04 
 (0.20) (9.0e-04) 
Household income/100,000 1.15** 0.01** 
 (0.46) (2.0e-03) 
Households income/100,000)2 -0.30 -1.5e-03 
 (0.21) (1.0e-03) 
Lagged household net wealth/100,000 -0.06** -3.0e-04** 
 (0.02) (1.0e-04) 
Lagged household net wealth/100,000)2 3.0e-04*** 1.5e-06*** 
 (1.0e-04) (4.9e-07) 
Cost of housing/non-durable expenditure 1.18*** 0.01*** 
 (0.24) (1.1e-03) 
Bank branches per 1,000 inhab (per province) 0.55 2.8e-03 
 (0.72) (3.6e-03) 
Per-capita GDP/1,000  (per province) 0.02 1.0e-04 
 (0.01) (1.0e-04) 
Length of civil trials days/100) -0.03 -2.0e-04 
 (0.03) (1.0e-04) 
Living in the Center 4.83*** 0.81*** 
 (0.62) (0.13) 
Living in the South 2.27*** 0.07 
 (0.67) (0.06) 
Constant -0.73  
 (1.20)  
No of observations 28,462 28,462 
Pseudo R2 0.53  
P-value test for dummies for province = 0 0.00  
P-value test for dummies for year = 0 0.00  
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Table 5 
Probability of choosing an ARM 
The dependent variable takes on the value of one (zero) if the household, which has purchased its home and 
has been granted a mortgage in the two years prior that of interview, has chosen an ARM (FRM). The second 
column reports the marginal effects of the probit in the first column. The probit in the last column allows for 
sample self-selection. The estimates have been corrected for cluster for provincial effects. * significant at 10 
per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level. 
 Basic specification Heckman 
correction 
Bank 
controls 
 Coefficient 
(stand. error) 
Marginal 
effect (st. err.) 
Marginal 
effect (st. err.) 
Marginal 
effect (st. err.) 
Interest rate on ARMs 0.16** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
   (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
FRM-ARM spread 0.24*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
  (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Long term yield 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.03 
  (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
House price x m2/(Income/100,000) -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
House price x m2 (per province) 0.40*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
  (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age -1.67** -0.63** -0.72** -0.54* 
  (0.76) (0.3) (0.31) (0.31) 
Gender 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.02 
  (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
High education 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 
  (0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Married -0.24 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 
  (0.20) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Children (dummy) -0.15** -0.06** -0.06** -0.05* 
  (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
No. of income recipients -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Continues Table 5 
Probability of moving  1.66 0.68 0.74 0.90 
  (1.72) (0.68) (0.67) (0.75) 
Moved from province of birth 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Public employee 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Self-employed 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.06 
  (0.21) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Non-durable expenditure/Income 0.47 0.18 0.20 0.13 
  (0.48) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
High non-durable expenditure  0.62** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 
  (0.27) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Household income/100,000 0.43 0.17 0.18 0.28 
  (0.67) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) 
Lagged household wealth/100,000 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants 1.10** 0.42** 0.45** 0.47* 
  (0.54) (0.21) (0.22) (0.25) 
Mills ratio   0.02  
    (0.02)  
Constant -3.62***    
  (1.4)    
     
No. of observations 420 420 420 420 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 
P-value test year dummies = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
P-value test main bank dummies = 0    0.02 
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Table 6 
Characteristics of ARMs and FRMs – Matching Model 
The table presents the results of a matching logit regressions of the characteristics of ARMs and FRMs. The mean 
of each variable is calculated for samples of comparable adjustable and fixed rate mortgages, where the matching 
is done using a propensity score function with the kernel option, controlling for characteristics of the household 
(age, gender, education and occupation of the head, marital status and number of income recipients) and of the 
credit market (number of bank branches and household main bank dummies), and including geographical and time 
dummies. P-values for the test of significance of differences of means are reported in parenthesis (significance is 
computed by using the bias-corrected confidence interval). 
 Variables ARMs FRMs Difference (p-value) 
Mortgage size 67,634  66,368  4,056  
   (0.91)  
Interest rate 6.73  6.58  0.15  
   (0.57)  
House value 181,513  169,601  11,912  
   (0.89)  
Average value of installment 6,063  5,639  424  
   (0.48)  
Maturity 14.34  13.82  0.52  
   (0.89)  
Loan to value ratio 0.44  0.44  0.00  
   (1.00)  
Risk premium 1.25  -0.11  1.37  
   (0.00)  
No. of  observations (common support) 222  181    
No. of  observations 237  184    
 
 
 
